![]() 6ĭeploying modern naval mines from submarines could allow the Silent Service a safer, cheaper path to replicate the efficacy of its 1940s forebears. submarine force in the Pacific during World War II destroyed 55 percent of Japan’s merchant shipping, causing a shortfall in hulls that crippled the empire’s supply chains. Undersea warfare has historically presented a critical threat to enemy war efforts. ![]() Underseas Deploymentįor maximum lethality, mines need not only be carried by aircraft or surface vessels. minefields could become so lethal that enemy air and naval forces might avoid them altogether. ![]() Dropped in hedgehog formations of concentric rings that combined torpedoes, antisurface missiles, and antiair missiles, U.S. Placed correctly, even the best-guarded surface vessels could be surprised by attacks from mine-based systems at close range. Consideration might also be given to developing Quickstrike-ER versions of antisurface or antiair missiles-for instance, Harpoon missiles or the abortive subsurface version of the AIM-9X. Credit: Naval Institute Photo ArchiveĪs renewed great power competition puts pressure on the Department of Defense’s budget, redeveloping the previous generation of submarine-launched weapons for use as homing mines provides an opportunity to extend the utility of the current arsenal. The crew of the USS Ludlow (DD-112) lays practice mines off the coast of Lahaina, Maui, in the interwar period. The current Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)-ER project is a strong step in the right direction. Navy should prioritize developing and stockpiling complex mine obstacles that can be emplaced from standoff range and disrupt both air and sea traffic. 2 As near-peer adversaries fortify “bastions” from which they intend to project control of territorial or international waters, the lessons of subsurface and mine warfare from past campaigns become relevant once again. In the era of advanced A2/AD capabilities, traditional offensive missions structured around carrier groups or Marine expeditionary units are often highly vulnerable and cumbersome. Mines and minefields are critical tools to support the Navy–Marine Corps team’s future strategic vision. The result would place adversary navies on the horns of the same dilemma that characterizes combat against insurgencies armed with IEDs on land: consistent attrition, loss of mobility, and delays, allowing the Navy–Marine Corps team to take on an insurgent’s ability to isolate, prioritize, and destroy enemy bastions at will. mines that appear randomly within their antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) zone, enemy forces would be subjected to considerable, ever-increasing friction. To properly confront modern naval combat, the Navy–Marine Corps team should develop the capacity to wage a “naval insurgency.” Naval Insurgency Tacticsįacing “hedgehogs” of U.S. 1 Just as roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attrite and slow maneuverability on a highway, the struggle of overcoming mine ordnance in other areas of the modern battlespace allows Mao’s precept to be inverted. A practiced guerrilla fighter and leader, Mao Zedong instructed insurgents to “swim” among the people like fish in the sea.
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